complex systems theory. This is crystalized into a concrete machine: the screen which allows an extended definition of Bergson's movement-images. Suggesting a few opening steps towards a history of these images, I will propose that they harbor a BwO with powers to resist the historization of abstract diagrams.
Empty time and mechanics
In 1781, when Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1996) was published in its first edition, the precise chronographs of John Harrison had only a few decades earlier helped the British navy determine longitude at sea (Howse, 1997 ). Harrison's invention enabled accurate navigation and cartography anywhere on the globe; James Cook used the clocks during his second and third journeys, and the captain praised them for their accuracy. This was a technological victory over an ancient challenge and also, as it were, a decisive factor for the formation of global world capitalism. But what was it about overcoming this threshold that made it so difficult, yet so desirable? Quite simply, there was a lot of power and money at stake, but in order to harvest this potential wealth one had to change some very fundamental patterns of thinking. From long before the great journeys by Ferdinand Magellan, Christopher Columbus, and Vasco da Gama in the late 15th century there had been a firmly established triangular relationship between astronomy, time, and nautical navigation by latitude. Now, by the early renaissance it was also theoretically known that, if one could tell the exact time difference between one's home port and the present location at sea, one could also determine one's longitude by observing the position of the stars. As astronomy governed both time and navigation, it is not surprising that, when King Philip III of Spain issued a reward for the solution to the longitude problem in the early 17th century, Galileo responded to the challenge with a telescope and a numerical table. By observing the position of the moons of Jupiter with this visual instrument, a correct longitude could theoretically be calculated anywhere on the planet; but its impracticability at sea lost him the prize money.
King Philip's reward was an investment in the production of new knowledge. And he was not the only royalty in Europe willing to pay for knowing how to determine longitude: the courts of England, France, Portugal, and Italy had also promised handsome rewards for the unveiling of this secret, which promised both more and safer long-distance commerce with fewer losses of ships and cargo, and, therefore, a corresponding deepening of the administrative regulation of goods and colonized subjects. In DeLandean terms, one could say that solving the longitude problem would produce a desirable phase transition of the autocatalytic dynamics that regulated political economy in 17th-century and 18th-century Europe (2) ; a small piece of new information would recast a proportionally very large part of the complex processes that produced and sustained social and economical orders. What was necessary in order to attain this knowledge was, first of all, to crack open the astronomical bond between time and navigation. The mechanical clocks that had been developing steadily since the 15th century conceptualized time and space as measurable, divisible, and hence calculable by means of a standardized extension. The pendulum clocks were, however, not very reliable at sea (although Christiaan Huygens, the Dutch horological genius of (2) Raising the question of why Europe suddenly became the dominant civilization during the 15th century and 16th century when both China and Islam where much more developed in terms of both technology and economy, DeLanda leans on historian Paul Kennedy's argument that a number of factors were crucial, among them the simultaneous expansion of two types of cities: the inland administrative capital and the maritime metropolis. While China and Islam closed in on themselves, Europe could develop powerful nation-states with a certain degree of self-stimulating dynamics. As these dynamics fostered new development, the term`autocatalytic dynamics' can be used to describe a macropolitical feedback process (see DeLanda, 1997, pages 49^52) . the 17th century, claimed otherwise). What was needed was an independent motor to simulate the steady progression of time: one that was absolutely independent from any stellar body, including the gravitational pull of the earth. By the end of the 18th century, time was about to break free from the forces of both heaven and earth, and more than 300 years of mechanical development in spring-driven clockworks finally paid off with Harrison's chronographs.
Historically, this coincides with Kant presenting an alternative to both clock time and cosmological time. Kant expressed a notion of time that was absolutely new. In the face of all empirical evidence, he held that time was neither divisible nor measurable nor even calculable. Time and space, he said, are``empty forms of intuition'' (Kant, 1996, page 88) . Only Isaac Newton had said something similar previously: that time was``empty'' (Newton, 1999, page 408) . But Newton considered time a mathematical void from which to express the regularity of moving bodies through space, described in his equations as law. What Kant did when he expressed both time and space as irreducibly empty forms of intuition was in a sense similar to Newton, but also very different, as he dissociated time from the measurement of moving bodies. Kant was the first to express time as an absolute a priori condition for subjective experience. It meant that time was understood as a necessary condition for perception, but could not itself be empirically proven by measuring something else: time had become an absolute precondition, given only by its own internal necessity.
For Kant there is no essence behind appearances (Deleuze, 1978) . In that sense, the classical world turns outside in with his philosophy; the truth is no longer`out there' beyond the perceivable things in the world, but in here: in the capacities we humans have at our disposal for perceiving the world and ourselves, for organizing and judging our perceptions, and for rationalizing the way we judge. When time and space are determined as necessary forms for these subjective faculties to have any effect on each other, a whole new universe opens. Outside of time and space there would be no knowable world, because our judging faculties would come unhinged from each other.
Philosophically, the expression of this new world determined by human faculties belongs to Kant, but a mechanical desire for expressing these faculties can be located earlieröin the popular spectacle of automata. Mechanical men had become increasingly popular during the 17th and 18th century, and had by the 1740s developed into machines that could express not only physical movement but also human spiritual facilities. Jacques de Vaucanson displayed a mechanical flute player to the Parisian public in 1737, and Pierre Jaquet-Droz and his son Henri-Lois made three dolls around this time named Charles, Marianne, and Henry, which were fluent in the beaux arts of writing, music, and drawing. Automata became a powerful new mirror image of the human, and in 1770 Wolfgang von Kempelen presented to the empress Maria Theresa of Austria-Hungary a Turkish chess-playing automaton that seemed to have mechanized the processes of human understanding. The sensations that these automata caused önot only at the courts, but also in the popular waterholes for the lower aristocracyödid not fall short of the sublime (Standage, 2002) . As in the popular tale about Pinocchio, transcribed in 1881 by Carlo Collodi, most builders of automatons in the 18th century made their living as clockmakers. As if by means of analogy, God himself was employed as clockmaker of the universe by enlightened intellectuals.
It must not be understood hereby that automata actually expressed the Kantian notion of time avant la lettre and in mechanical shape; quite the contrary, automata articulated merely a desire towards the zone between enlightenment and romanticism from which Kant's philosophy eventually emerged (Deleuze, 1984) . (3) This zone could (3)``T hus we have the Critique of Judgment as foundation of Romanticism'' (page xii).
be described as a space between, on the one hand, a desire for the unification of man and world in reason, and, on the other hand, a compelling attention towards the creativity of human imagination. It is from here that Kant's philosophy draws its strength. The automaton, by comparison, was both a preparation for this zone and, then, a domestic little monster within it: a tantalizing threat from the margins of the possible and, as such, an image perfectly in line with both the rational progress of industrialization and the preromantic courtship of indeterminability. The late writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the stories by Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffman are early examples of this duality; Edgar Allan Poe's analysis of the chess-playing Turk in 1836 and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein from 1818 are somewhat later ones.
One could say that what the automaton did for the image of human beings was similar to what the determination of the longitude did for the mapping of the world. Both assisted European empires in entering global capitalism by showing new possibilities for appropriating and organizing human labor and global infrastructure for political and economical gain. As Walter Benjamin intimated in his``On the concept of history'' (2003a), the Turkish chess-player has its``philosophical counterpart'' (page 389) not in Kant but in a theologically invested historical materialist who is writing against the political consequences of global capitalism. Thus the monstrous automata managed to survive in various forms, and are probably still alive in this day. Yet when their first spectacular aura began to wane from the limelight during the end of the 18th century, anotherömuch more Kantianömechanic subjectification of the human faculties appeared, with a different type of spectacle than the theatrical performances of automata.
The physiogontrace was a mechanical device for mass-producing portraits, which required merely an operatorönot an artistöto trace with a marker the facial features of a subject. The movement of the marker was then transferred via a pantograph (a system of parallel levers) to a pen that drew the sitter's face on a piece of paper or on a metal sheet. Even a slave could produce a``perfectly correct representation'' in less than five minutes (Peale, 1988 , page 249, quoted in Knipe, 1999 . French photographer and writer Gise© le Freund was in 1974 Freund was in (1980 among the first to recognize the social and historical importance of this machine. She noticed that the personal skill and`touch' of the miniature portrait paintersöwhich had been so highly esteemed in the mid-18th centuryöwas almost instantly devaluated with the appearance of the physiognotrace. Understanding why the charm of artistic personality was so readily abandoned is pinpointed by Freund as a crucial starting point for analyzing the technical visuality of the revolutionary years after 1789 and, also, how the developing alliance between the masses and visual technology came to prepare for the popular success of photography. For my theoretical construction, however, it is equally urgent to remark on the similarity between the mechanical structure of the physiognotrace and the basic structure of Kant's transcendental aesthetics. Just as for Kant the sensuous faculty conditions the notion of representation (Vorstellung) by letting its passively apprehended appearances be judged by the active faculty of understanding, so the operator of the physiognotrace passively relays the sensuous tracings of the sitter's physiognomy into a representation whose truthfulness was guaranteed by the synthetic a priori translation performed by the machine. For the sitter, the experience of being traced was a highly sensuous experience, even if what was traced was merely the sitter's silhouette (as was the case with some physiognotraces); the subject had to be absolutely still, and any bodily movement during the process risked producing a deformity. That risk betrays also the presence of Kantian time and space: a priori forms of intuition to which the production of representation by the physiognotrace was fundamentally subjected.
After the daguerreotype had been patented in France in 1839 and the fascination for the new technology literally exploded over Europe in the early 1840s, contemporary accounts of the daguerre¨otypomanie (4) suggest that it was still the experience of an automatic recording of one's physiognomical likeness that provided one of the more mind-blowing features of photography. Charles Baudelaire's famous mockery of the public support for the latest fashion is extremely to the point. He heard the public say:``I believe that art is, and can only be, the exact reproduction of nature.' (One timid and dissenting sect wants naturally unpleasing objects, a chamber pot, for example, or a skeleton, to be excluded.)`Thus if an industrial process could give us a result identical to nature, that would be absolute art.' An avenging God has heard the prayers of this multitude; Daguerre was his messiah'' (Baudelaire, 1980, page 86) .
The common sensation at the timeöthat photography was a completely mechanical expression of the human capacity to produce visual artösparked the well-known and long-lived disputes of whether or not photography was an art form. But, of all the things that photography actually challenged, the one that today, in the rear-view mirror of history, seems to have been the most crucial, was the meaning of visual self-representation. As Foucault showed in Discipline and Punish (1991), machines for self-surveillance and self-observation appeared for the first time around the early 19th century, and modern hospitals, prisons, schools, and army barracks began essentially to produce a new human body. However, photography counts no less than these more commonly mentioned Foucauldean motifs among the modern institutions for self-visualization (Batchen, 1999; Didi-Huberman, 2003) . What makes photography special when placed among these other institutionsöat least in relation to the Kantian conceptualization of the transcendental subjectöis that it alone externalized what was most conditional for the`Man' that had just appeared to himself: photography articulated visually the existence of temporal difference.
Experience and the time of Nachtra« glicheit To differentiate between modes of time would be an illusion according to Kant. But the calm and unified mode of experience described in Kant's philosophy was itself an illusion, at least if compared with those whose senses were bombarded in the large industrial factories and those who lived on the streets in the big cities or served as soldiers in the increasingly mechanized wars. The Austrian writer Robert Musil gave a remarkable voice to their disabled capacity to form a coherent experience, almost 150 years after Kant's first critique. In a passage from The Man Without Qualities (1997), a character called General Stumm is struck by a sudden inability to fit his sensuous perceptions into categories of understanding during a conversation with the industrialist Dr Paul Arnheim. What is striking about Musil's rendering of their verbal exchange is that it portrays their different abilities to deal with the technological violence of the metropolitan space. Commenting upon this passage, Frederik Tygstrup has articulated that difference very precisely:`A rnheim recognizes effortlessly his role as prince of the new age. When everything drift [s] without an anchor, and the most stable person begins to waver', Arnheim is ready to represent with his own person the progress of the coming culture. And he stands on the solid foundation of his extraordinary wealth, whose efficacy he needs not question. ... General Stumm does not doubt Arheim's superiority and gleans unhappily at how the nabob fits into his element and establishes a sovereign's space around himself. While he takes up the vastness of the square like a blinking steam liner, the corpulent general is painfully tossed this way and that by his impetuous ideas like a buoy that has lost its anchorage (to use Arnheim's apposite phrasingöconsistently with the imagery of the passage)'' (Tygstrup, 2000) .
The industrialist and the general are physically standing in the same placeöthe square in front of Vienna's national libraryöbut their capacities to form an experience differ from each other. The metropolis with its trams and streetlights, its noise and bustle, tears a possible Kantian synthesis to shreds and with it the possibility for a communal experience. It is the magnate who knows how to master this place with meaningless conversation while the general is lost to the surrounding cacophony:`T he General began to be troubled by a nervous fear that if he had to go on listening much longer, he might suddenly go down on his knees and eat grass in front of the whole world, without knowing why'' (Musil, 1997, page 617) .
But, on the other hand, the poor general has understood something crucial about the violent forces in both Arnheim's endless chatter and the metropolitan commotion that has confused his senses. One of the general's few contributians to the conversation is this:``Every moment of our lives we move among institutions, problems, and challenges of which we have barely caught the tail end, so the present is constantly reaching into the past. We keep crashing through the floor, if I may put it so, into the cellars of time, even while we imagine ourselves to be occupying the top floor of the present'' (pages 616^617).
It is as if General Stumm actually knows why a communal experience and a shared language cannot be possible: the temporal presence that for Kant conditioned experience is not present to itself. If time were indeed an a priori condition for experience as such, then the very possibility of mistaking the basement of the past for the highest level of the present would not present itself. Thus he knows that time cannot be the necessary, a priori form of intuition that conditions sensuous perception: the very mistakability of time is itself manifesting a sensation of time being different from itself.
It is not strange but merely anachronistic that Musil's General Stumm would be so familiar with this`impossible' sensation already in January 1914; he would, however, be likely to suffer from itöthough hardly able to discourse about itöin the years to come. During the First World War, the concept of war neurosis, or`shell shock' was employed to describe a malady that struck about 2% of the British soldiers (Binneweld, 1998) . After the war this shameful disorder was reported to be five times more frequent among officers than among men at the front. Ernest Jones, President of the British Psychoanalytic Association during the war, was one among several medical professors forwarding the hypothesis that shell shock was not a physical damage to the nervous system, but a psychological disorder. About the consequences of soldiers' duties during warfare, he wrote:`a ll sorts of previously forbidden and hidden impulses, cruel, sadistic, murderous and so on, are stirred to greater activity, and the old intrapsychical conflicts which, according to Freud, are the essential cause of all neurotic disorders, and which had been dealt with before by means of`repression' of one side of the conflict are now reinforced, and the person is compelled to deal with them afresh under totally different circumstances'' (Jones, 1921 , pages 47^48, quoted in Bourke, 2002 . In 1920, Sigmund Freud published a somewhat tentative text called Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1961) that would have a powerful impact on much later theory. The manuscript had been written a year earlier when Freud also produced``Introduction to psycho-analysis and war neurosis' ' (1955a) and The Uncanny (1955b). In the opening to the second chapter of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud writes:`T he terrible war which has just ended gave rise to a great number of illnesses of this kind [traumatic neuroses], but it at least put an end to the temptation to attribute the cause of the disorder to organic lesions of the nervous system brought about by mechanical force. The symptomatic picture presented by traumatic neurosis approaches that of hysteria in the wealth of its similar motor symptoms, but surpasses it as a rule in its strongly marked signs of subjective ailment'' (page 10).
Among scholars of Freud the early 1920s are often considered a period of major change in Freud's work. Notions such as`repetition compulsion' and`death drive' appear as psychic motors working in the opposite direction of the desire, or Trieb, that in the previous texts maintains psychic life in exclusive accordance with the conservative principle of pleasure. It is as if Freud breaks away from the structure of his earlier thought and introduces phenomena that demand a fundamentally dialectical analysis. But, with regards to that dialectical representation, the opposition never quite closes. Freud's later thought is itself an open epilogue, something that, with Jacques Derrida's appropriation of Freud's terminology, might be called``the Nachtra« glichkeit of the afterword'' (Derrida, 1992, page 196, emphasis in original) .
What is this term`Nachtra« glichkeit'? It is often translated as`deferral' and is used to describe an event that manifests itself for the first time as a compulsory memory or in a dream. The phenomenal appearance of this event, visual or otherwise, does not coincide with its factual occurrence but is delayed or deferred already when first perceived. Freud believed that if an extremely violent event occursöprimarily if it is sudden, causes fear, is perceived visually, and does not harm the physical organismöits energies may be too powerful for the subject to harbor within the mental apparatus. This event pierces through what is called the subject's`perception-consciousness' mechanism, and lodges itself directly in the unconscious. Hence, the ailments of hysteria and war neurosis are caused by past events, of whose occurrence the patient is perfectly unaware.
To the extent that the pleasure principle rules the subject (as in Freud's earlier work on hysteria), all feelings of pleasure and unpleasure correspond to a decrease or increase of perceptive excitation from the outside, during a continuous flow of time. Freud stresses the importance of this temporality. Accelerated excitation feels bad, decelerated excitation feels good. After the war, however, while examining the cases of traumatic war neurosis, Freud revised one of the basic assumptions from the earlier analyses of hysteria: that all excitations happen in continuous time. To the contrary, Freud now suggests that the very notion of continuous time is merely abstract and may be something that is constructed by the perception-consciousness mechanism.`O ur abstract idea of time seems to be wholly derived from the method of working of the system Pcpt.-Cs. [perception-consciousness] and to correspond to a perception on its own part of that method of working. This mode of functioning may perhaps constitute another way of providing a shield against stimuli' ' (1961, page 32) . This shield against stimuli is what protects our perceptive organs from overstimulation or shock.
Freud turns the very notion of experience inside out and realizes that this is a theory strictly at odds with Kantian philosophy. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he indicates a willingness to``embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem that time and space are necessary forms of thought '' (1961, page 31) . The time that to Kant is an a priori form of intuition is to Freud a condition merely for a specific mode of experience that protects the unconscious behind a frail unity of perception and consciousness. When that protective shield is violently pierced by an excessive impression, the subject is exposed to trauma. The compulsory repetitions that follow from the ensuing neurosis do not belong to the pleasure principle accounted for with Kantian psychoanalysis. Nachtra« glichkeit is the time of a much more primitive drive, the death drive, operating beyond the pleasure principle.
The sciences of motion and heat
In the late 18th century, spring-driven clockworks had developed enough to compete with the pendulum as a reliable clock motor. Shortly afterwards, in 1810, the first massproduced clocks began to appear from Eli Terry's factory in Connecticut. Together these developments enabled another role for clocks in the development of Western capitalism (apart from providing accurate navigation at sea): portable clocks became affordable and were as reliable as stationary ones. Accurate pocket watches could now become a tool for coordinating mobile organizations and administration. A military campaign, for example, could strategically become increasingly complex and businessmen could more efficiently coordinate their schedules. The pocket watch became a signal of power and wealth as clocks helped to pave the way for the escalation of global trade, colonialism, and commodification of labor in the 19th century. But clocks alone did not suffice. Time and technology were also assembled quite differently and were to play another important role in science. In the 1820s the steam engine had already entered the coal mines, the factories, ships, and trains, and made production, trade, and transportation possible on a scale never seen before. It provided the raw force that propelled Victorian industrial capitalism to an imperialistic level. Unknown to most scientists at the time, a young French military engineer, Sadi Carnot, published a paper in 1824 (1948) where he praised the British employment of the steam engine. He also expressed the desire to contribute to its development by describing the general principles for how to produce motion from heat. This article would later be heralded as a huge scientific achievement, though almost nobody recognized it at the time; Carnot described what was to become the foundation for thermodynamics, mathematically formulated some twenty-six years later by Rudolf Clausius and William Thomson.
What these physicists could formally prove was a new universal theory derived from the principles Carnot had described in an engineer's prose. Carnot's observation that motion power is produced by a necessary difference in temperature, and not through its consumption, gave way to the first law of thermodynamics: that, when one form of energy is transformed into another, the sum of converted amounts of energy is always the same. And, as Carnot had also detected the empirical impossibility of an ideal reversible engine, he also foresaw the second law, which described the notion of entropy: that, in every conservation of energy, there is always an unavoidable waste that is heat. In 1865 Clausius could determine mathematically the entropy increase in all natural changes (see Wheeler, 1998) .
The thermodynamic revolution proves that the universe is historical, with a temporal beginning and a future end towards which we are inevitably heading. This is quite the opposite of the fixed, static universe described by Newton's reversible equations. For sixty years after Clausius, the big question in modern physics was how to reconcile a dynamic physics, which describes the universe developing in a certain direction, with classical physics according to which the laws of the universe are eternal.
Ludwig Boltzmann was a late-19th-century physicist for whom Charles Darwin was as great an authority as Newton. By developing a statistical mechanics from probability laws, Boltzmann set out to bridge the gap between the historical and the static universe by showing that the entropy level at the initial state of the universe was extremely low and that its increase is merely the most probable direction of development. (5) As Ilya Prigogine has described it:``there is no intrinsic direction to time, it is nothing but the direction towards what is probable, the disorder, the broken cup' ' (1993, page 27) . Albert Einstein recognized Boltzmann's mechanical statistics in an early paper on thermodynamics, written in 1902. But Einstein's later radicalization meant that Newton's division between energy and matter begins to disintegrate. To Einstein, matter became energy of a certain modality. And, when matter could be understood as merely a form of energy, the notion of change becomes the hinge of the universe. In the special theory of relativity, time and space are considered as one singular unified continuum, whose extension and curved shape are relative to variations of gravity (Einstein, 1920 ).
(5) For a more recent version of this theory see Huw Price (1996) . This, as both Kurt Go« del and Henri Bergson noticed, had a fantastic impact on the existing philosophies of time. But they disagreed fundamentally as to what this impact really meant. Departing from Einstein's relativity of simultaneity (that two things may appear to be simultaneous for one observer, whereas to a different observer they appear to be successive) Go« del finds in it``unequivocal proof for the view of those philosophers who, like Parmenides, Kant, and the modern idealists, deny the objectivity of change and consider change as an illusion or an appearance due to our special mode of perception'' (1949, page 557). Bergson (1999) contradicted Go« del by pointing out that the time that is shared by Einstein's two observers is their lived time: their experience of duration that is independent from clock time, and, unlike Kant's time, does not constitute a formal a priori for a subject's phenomenological faculties. The lived time that Einstein suggests to Bergson is, contrary to the time he articulates for Go« del, a time wholly coextensive with change.
Another, and alternative, understanding of how time for Einstein is relative to the speed of the perceiving subject could perhaps be traced from the observation that causality is an absolute in Einstein's universe. This approach towards Einstein's time would speak in favor of Go« del's interpretation. But, far from being identical to Kant's time, Einstein's time might be considered closer to that of Freud. To historians of modern physics, Einstein's insistency on the category of causality is often referred to as the dividing line between quantum physics and the theory of relativity. In an article published in 1949, Niels Bohr recalls his dispute with Einstein as the question of how to understand the Heisenberg principle. The principle was formulated in 1927 and maintains that it is impossible to determine both the position and momentum of an elementary particle at the same time. Although Bohr and Einstein agreed on the empirical validity of this principle, which derived from the observation that elementary particles are affected by the instrument with which they are measured, they did not agree on whether the necessary ambiguity was in the instrument or in the nature of the particle itself. Bohr, advocating the latter position, argued for a complementary theory, as``evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects'' (page 210, emphasis in the original).
Einstein responded with what Bohr remembers as``a deep concern over the extent to which causal account in space and time was abandoned in quantum mechanics'' (page 212). At the fifth Physics Conference of the Solvay Institute, held in Brussels in October 1927, Bohr and Einstein engaged in a heated debate over this issue. Einstein pronounced what would become one of his most famous statements:``God does not play dice'' (page 218), and Bohr reminded him of the ancients' prohibition against`a scribing attributes to Providence in everyday language'' (page 218).
Photographic times
Western science, literature, art, and philosophy witnessed around the 1920s a plethora of revolutionary discourses and practices. Here, nothing but a small sample has been outlined. (6) But, to the extent that this sample has managed to convey a shift in the (6) If I leave other fundamental achievements from this period uncommented on, for instance the philosophies of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Edmund Husserl, art movements such as surrealism, expressionism, Bauhaus, the rising of skyscrapers in Chicago and New York, or the literary publications of Franz Kafka, or Marcel Proustöjust to mention a fewöthis is less a result of either negligence or a judgment of historical relevance, but rather because of a lack of ability to compose a larger field. With this note I merely wish to indicate the possibility to expand the horizons; this would do service only to the project of maintaining the openness of the aforementioned BwOs.
set of conditions for experience around this time, it may be suggested that the later mode of experience could reflect only in a peculiar way on its past and give a legacy to the future, given that its notions of time and history were fundamentally reconsidered (Petersson, 2004) . It seems that the years after the First World War were ripe to express a mode of experience one may call photographic. One could also call it something else, as photography was but one important technique for expressing the postwar experience. But`photographic' is perhaps a well-chosen term, especially as something remarkable also happened to photography around this time. What became`photographic' about photography in the 1920s did not concern its origin or its essence, but a notion of deferred temporality that contradicts the very ideas of originality and essentiality. This notion is why some histories of photography have hesitated before ascribing the origin of photography to the inventions by Henry Fox Talbot, Louis Jacques Mande¨Daguerre, or Nice¨phore Nie¨pce in the 1830s, but have been compelled to take stock of the work of Euge© ne Atget (Benjamin, 1999a; Frizot, 1998) . (7) His works date from between the turn of the century and the early 1920s; the technology he used was as old as the Parisian motifs he portrayed and he sold his pictures for a penny to be filed as historical documents for designers and architects. It was Bernice Abbott who discovered his work when the photographer was about to die, and she bought as many of his prints as she could. What the history of photography found in Atget, as a condition for its own expression, was the notion of deferral: a noematic``That-has-been'' in the terms of Roland Barthes (1981, page 77) . (8) Deferral as a condition for experience was also what General Stumm expressed in the excerpt from The Man Without Qualities given above; it was what Freud advanced with the concept of Nachtra« glichkeit while discoursing on death drive and the compulsive repetition. The deferral of relative simultaneity was also, as figure 1 (over) is intended to illustrate, explicitly referred to as photographic when Einstein blasphemously argued with Bohr. The plurality of irreconcilable observation points in Einstein's theory of relativity describes a`fragmented' physics, yet a physics whose causal coherence he chose to express with a schematic camera.
These drawings by Bohr illustrate the camera that Einstein used for reference during their disputes in Brussels. The problem it serves to communicate is whether it is possible or impossibleögiven the nature of a photon as simultaneous body and waveöto predict causally the most probable position of the particle on a photosensitive plate after it has been diffracted by two apertures, as shown in figure 1(b). As causality is indisputable in Einstein's spacetime continuum, he argued that measuring the faint momentum transfer from photon to hardware could indicate which slit the particle had passed through and thus give causal information of where one could be likely to register a photographic reaction. Bohr replied that the flexibility of the diaphragm, which would be necessary to order to measure the momentum transfer, would render a proper observation of the interference phenomenon impossible. For Bohr, Einstein's demand for causality is incompatible with the necessary choice between interference pattern and measurable momentum transfer; however, as a deferred cause the interference pattern proves that``on the one hand, the photon always chooses one of the two ways and, on the other hand, that it behaves as if it had passed both ways'' (Bohr, 1949, page 222, emphasis in original) . In other words, while the diffraction is taking place we have absolutely no way of knowing or measuring through which slit the photon passes öonly afterwards can it be determined statistically from the patterns of the photograph. Bohr, 1949 ; by permission of the Niels Bohr Archive). (a) A single light particle of a constant wavelength (represented by a horizontal line through several verticle lines) passes through an aperture, whereafter the light waves diffract. (b) Light of a constant wavelength passes through first one aperture and then through either of two parallel apertures and causes a pattern on a photosensitive plate. Remarkably, the pattern occurs even if only one light particle is sent through the first aperture. (c) One of the second apertures has a shutter which may prevent the appearance of the pattern, but, as long as both apertures are open, we have no way of knowing through which aperture the particle passes or what causes the pattern, unless, that is, the particle paradoxically passes through both apertures without dividing.
Hence, Einstein's use of a photographic model underscores his theoretical position on time as being closer to Freud than to that of either Kant or Bergson.
Freud, too, was prone to refer to photographic images. Considering the temporal structure intended with his metaphors, it is perhaps only fitting that they were first noticed and commented upon much later. In a footnote to the article``Freud and the scene of writing'' from 1967 (published in English in 1978), Derrida summed up the uses of photographic metaphors in Freud:`T he metaphor of a photographic negative occurs frequently. Cf.`The Dynamics of Transference' [Freud, 1958a] . The notions of a negative and copy are the principal means of analogy. In the analysis of Dora, Freud defines the transference in terms of editions. In`Notes on the Concept of the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis.' 1913 [Freud, 1958b, page 264] , Freud compares the relations between the conscious and the unconscious to a photographic process:`The first stage of the photograph is thè negative': every photographic process has to pass through the`negative process' and some of these negatives which have held good in examination are admitted to the`positive process' ending in the picture.' Hervey de Saint-Denys devotes an entire chapter of his book to the same analogy. The intentions are the same. They suggest a preoccupation that we will find again in the`Note on the Mystic Writing Pad': Memory, compared to a camera, has the marvelous superiority of natural forces: to be able to renew by itself its means of action ' '' (1978, page 330) . A more extensive deconstruction can be found in Sarah Kofman's Camera obscura de l'ide¨ologie [Camera obscura of ideology] from 1973. Apart from the photographic metaphors in Freud that Derrida mentions, Kofman finds a different, more interesting metaphor in``Moses and monotheism'' (Freud, 1964) where Freud associates the photographic negative with psychic imprints on children.``The negative'', she writes,``implies that a received strong impression can preserve itself without changing, and is repeated, and eventually developed as an image'' (Kofman, 1973, page 41) . But with this metaphor is also implied that the event that caused the imprint is never perceived as such. Thus the experience of the negative (which in the text``Moses and monotheism'' is related to the analysis of hysteria and Nachtra« glichkeit) does not fit a Hegelian temporality, although it too describes a successive movement from darkness to illumination (wrongfully described by Kofman as being linear in Hegel's work). Passing from the darkness of the unconscious to the light of consciousness is for Freud neither necessary nor dialectical, and the death drive which conditions this passage will itself never be illuminated. Kofman writes:`P assing from darkness to light is not, then, to recover a meaning already there; it is to construct a meaning that never existed as such. There is a compulsion to repetition because the plain meaning was never present. Repetition is the originary. Hoffmann's`creations' are souvenirs substituting for a memory that never took place, for a presence that was never there. Substitutional productionsönormal or pathologicalöare originary repetitions that allow constructing the meaning of the experience after the blow [apre© s coup], post festum'' (page 45, emphasis in original). It is remarkable that the temporality of Nachtra« glichkeit resurfaced with deconstruction; but, because it did, it is not so surprising that deconstruction was sometimes related to photography. As the concept diffe¨rance (difference and deferral) articulates an asymmetrical response to the phenomenological expression of time, perception, and understanding, Derrida's famous logic of the supplement has sometimes been perceived as photographic (Phillips, 1998; Petersson, forthcoming; von Amelunxen, 1998) . Further, since the 1980s the reception of Benjamin has also been very attentive to the photographic structure of his historical materialism ö regardless of whether his readers were disciples of the deconstruction vogue or not (Buck-Morss, 1990; Cadava, 1998).
The photographic metaphors are indeed plentiful in Benjamin's writings and are not infrequently connected to the notion of shock experience appropriated from Freud.
It is probably safe to say that the potentialities of Nachtra« glichkeit were never more faithfully explored than in the writings of Benjamin.``To read what was never written '' (von Hofmannsthal, 1982 , quoted in Benjamin, 1999b , page 416) is almost a motto for The Arcades Project, among whose fragments one may also find this quotation from Andre¨Monglond's Le Pre¨romantisme Franc°ais (The French preromanticism) (1930):`T he past has left images of itself in literary texts, images comparable to those which are imprinted on a photosensitive plate. The future alone possesses developers active enough to scan such surfaces perfectly. Many pages of Mariveaux or Rousseau contain a mysterious meaning which the first readers of these texts could not have fully deciphered '' (1999b, page 482) . Like the arcades motto, the Monglond quotation appears at least twice in Benjamin's Gesammelte Schriften, the second time merged with Hugo von Hofmannsthal in a preparatory note to the famous essay``On the concept of history' ' (2003a) . Under the heading``The dialectical image'' the following remarks are added to the Monglond quotation:``The historical method is a philological method based on the book of life. Read what was never written', runs a line in Hoffmansthal. The reader one should think of here is the true historian'' (2003b, page 405).
A different complexity of time
The formation of time expressed in photographyöin practice as well as in its use as a metaphoröis deferral. There is a technical aspect to photography that prevents the photographer from both perceiving and photographing an event simultaneously, from the exact same position in space. The two sides of a Kantian experience, perception and representation, cannot form an experience in continuous time and space. (9) Whether the photograph is produced with a camera or as a photogram does not matter, a light-sensitive emulsion cannot coexist spatially and temporally with a position occupied by a sensing subject. That is why, with a mirror reflex camera, the photographer's vision is literally blackened during the moment of photographing. With a Leica, a Polaroid, or a Kodak Instamatic, the eye looks slightly beside the lens. With a large format camera, one has to block the ground glass with the negative holder.
It is the required darkness inside the camera that excludes the possibility for seeing exactly what one photographs. One has to wait until the image is rendered visibleö that is, fixed öwhich is a process that comes later. The fixed image is the first time a photographed event can appear to our senses in time and space. But, then, one only experiences the event as photographed; how it would have been experienced when it happened, we can know only abstractly. Therefore, Benjamin writes from a photographic perspective when he says:``Articulating the past historically does not mean recognizing it`the way it really was' '' (2003a, page 391). Only if we imagine experiencing the photographed event, though nobody could possibly have experienced it from the same spatiotemporal position as the camera, does it fit within an empty, historical time. But the experiences we imagine and those that appears to our senses are radically different and must notöespecially after Kantöbe confused with each other.
(9) One can, of course, imagine possible exceptions from this rule: for example, photographing with a room-sized camera, inside which one may experience how an event is being both photographed and fixed. This is described in Baudelaire's poem Une fantoª me (see Baudelaire, 1997 , pages 96^103), and was common practice for those who used the camera obscura in the 18th century as an aid for drawing or painting. Contemporary artists such as Chuck Close and Steven Pippin have conducted experiments with this.
Another, very different formation of time became expressible after the Second World War and was increasingly developed in philosophy, art, and science during the 1950s and early 1960s. This was a time that had nothing to do with deferral. If deferral means that an event is experienced later, as a trace of itself, then this new time unfolded when matter came unhinged from formöthat is, in dynamic phenomena where form is not necessarily coextensive, or corresponding to the matter that supports it. What many scientists and artists began to address were dynamic phenomena that appeared, changed, and dissolved as complex formal structures according to a multitude of material and functional variables. Processual art practices such as land art, performance art, and conceptual art began to appear in Europe and the United States around the same time as stochastic processes were identified by sociologists, biologists, and engineers, and while mathematicians such as Andrej Kolmogorov and John W Milnor developed the formal topology of turbulent flows and dynamical systems.
One may illustrate these dynamic systems with a fairly quotidian event, an ordinary traffic jam. When scientists looked at traffic jams in the late 1950s and early 1960s (there had not really been many traffic jams before that) they felt the need to redefine what their object was, and even how it was (Tanner, 1961; Whiting and Hillier, 1960) . While a traffic jam was being defined, the roads, the streetlights, and the vehicles seemed reducible to process variables like speed limits or available alternative routes. Materially speaking, a traffic jam involves an increased density, but that in itself does not necessarily define a traffic jamöit may also define cars moving in a perfect flow at little or no speed: a parking lot, a funeral procession, or a parade. What scientists began to consider was that material variables and systematic variables might interact with each other to produce new forms spontaneously. In this sense, the phenomena that scientists and philosophers were attracted to in the mid-1950s and early 1960s were complex structures whose materiality and functionality did not belong to the formal individuality of an object per se. Rather, materiality and functionality seemed to be potential variables, which when moving towards certain values were at some point likely to effect a transition of a given system, which in turn could manifest a range of various phenomena.
At this moment in history many researchers and artists were increasingly prone to understand the formation of a structure as a spontaneous result of several heterogeneous systems interacting with each other. What seemed to bind such a plurality of heterogeneous systems together in the first place was not time or space but communication or information. A major question for researchers such as Douglas Engelbart or Norbert Wiener in the 1950s was how a given complexity of systems communicates, and what new forms it produces if one or several systems within that complexity change. Each system was considered pseudo-autonomous, with its own coherent time and its own continuous space that were irreducible to other systems. These theories sparked the controversy of whether there can be a kind of communication or language that overarches all systems. Structuralism and cybernetics developed as two very different attempts at working out such a language theory, but later in the 1960s, an oppositionary view argued successfully for an irreducible irreconcilability.
Electronic computers and the digital technologies that ensued were intimately associated with theories of complexity during the 1950s. A new branch of knowledge production seems to have developed after the Second World War, in which the understanding of time was very different from the notion of deferral I have discussed in relation to photography. Especially for theorists arguing for a radical heterogeneity between autonomous systems, the temporality that appeared had a radically new form. Time was plural, yet continuous. In other words, there were several different times at once that each formed a unified whole but none could unify the others.
Some notions of time in nonlinear processes
The task of thinking a form of time that corresponds to nonlinear systems, while keeping from contradicting the chronology that we also experience, has indeed been a productive one. Michel Serres argued in the 1960s for a network of times consisting of several heterogeneous time-formations (1997); Stephen Hawking proposed that time as such does not exist (1998), and Prigogine answered back to Hawking's reversible universe with a Bergsonian time of pure becoming (1993). Physicist Julien Barbour has argued that, while time as such may not be, a number of autonomous nows' may very well exist (2001). French philosopher Paul Virilio has, to the contrary, suggested that time is a continuous superficial expanse (1997) and the Italian philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato speaks of a crystalization of time structures that develop from our visual media sphere (2002) .
An interesting approach to the problem of time in nonlinear thinking, proposed by Adrian Mackenzie (2002), has been to redefine`clocktime'. Mackenzie defines clocktime not from what it measures, but solely from its technical mode of expression. Thus he suggests that all social, scientific, and personal time-formations depend on a clocktime that exists only on a virtual level. All of our different time-formations are heterogeneous actualizations of this clocktime. Even the history of time-formations since the 17th century would then``pass through metastable processes associated with clocktime as an event. Such an event may very well escape historical dating practices or a technological history of clocks'' (page 90, emphasis in original). A metastable state is defined as a``provisional equilibrium established when a system rich in potential differences resolves inherent incompatibilities by restructuring itself topologically and temporally'' (page 103). As Mackenzie goes on to say, the theory draws substantially on the work by Gilbert Simondon in the late 1950s and 1960s:`I n Simondon's preferred example of a physical metastability, a super-saturated chemical solution begins to crystallize. As it does, it`individuates': some singular point öan impurity, a seed crystalöin the solution permits the solution to restructure itself as a growing crystal. The crystal structures the energetic potentials of the solution ... . At the point of crystallization, the solution is metastable. The growth of the crystal represents a provisional resolution of the potential differences that precede it'' (pages 103^104). To use another of Simondon's terms, clocktime is here considered an abstract singularity that determines the variation and the evolution of time-formations as a nonlinear process of technicity. Such a process originates neither in the subject nor in the outside world, but as an``interweaving of living and non-living strands'' (page 89). This means that there is actually no second per seöa second is merely an abstract interval without proper existenceöbut there is a whole evolution of technical objectifications of that interval, involving several different variables of both human and nonhuman nature. Mackenzie traces the history of such objectifications from Huygen's pendulum clock to the cesium atom clock invented in the 1950s. What he is bound to discover is that the variables that determine the interval we call a second follow a tendency that, historically speaking, is continuously moving away from the perceptibility of the human senses. We may very well sense the interval of a pendulum swinging at 1.0 oscillations per second, but the 9192 631770 Hz of Cs-133 is far beyond our sensory capacity. What motivates this tendency? Mackenzie proposes that the development away from the human range of sensibility corresponds to the fact that history itself unfolds as a metastable process.`H uman time is being lost to an inhuman, globalizing, technological`time'. This time cannot be lived as such because its rhythms fall beneath the threshold of consciousness perception. ... As an evolutive or unfolding power, technicity structures particular technical objects, ensembles (such as the pendulum or the atomic clock) and living bodies as provisional solutions to the problem of how an ensemble of living and non-living processes articulates its own temporal and topological limits'' (pages 88^89). This development, the technicity of time, is indeed a thorny issue, but it seems that Mackenzie's construction proposes a surprisingly linear evolution of nonlinear processes which, as if becoming increasingly true to themselves, are successively doing away with the metaphysical and anthropocentric realm of perception. It is as if a dialectics was born in the renaissance, with the human body and the mechanical clock as oppositions, whose reconciliation is visible today in the shape of nanotechnology and global communications. The question that must be posed to this model is why sensuousness again must be degraded in the face of nonlinearity.
Mackenzie might answer that, with the developing actualizations of clocktime (which unfolds historically as a chain of metastable processes), a number of different human perceptibilities have been crystalizing, each with its own formation of time. Every moment of crystalization of clocktime has its particular form that may coexist with other forms, either as separate formations or as complementary formations. These time-formations may die out and new ones may come into being, and their coming and going is regulated by a complex weave of other events and formations. The growing complexity exceeds the range of what we have grown accustomed to call`human sensibility'. The human body is no longer a frontier against the outside world but a passage, or an interweaved multiplicity of strands whose processes are propeled by what we call`technicity'. So why protect the term`human' when we have externalized our entire sensorium into a sphere of technicity?
But, however forceful and agreeable this imaginary reply may seem, one might still argue that several`nonhuman' percepts were crystalizing long before time-formations were determined by clock timeöfor example, the compass or the lensöand that, therefore, clocktime is far too reductive a notion of virtual time to determine all of today's social, scientific, and personal time-formations. In order to continue this discussion one may try a fresh perspective. A similar, yet alternative account can be found in DeLanda's recent work Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (2002) .
The main purpose stated in DeLanda's book is to explain the philosophical world of Deleuze to analytical scientists. DeLanda's key to bridging this notoriously difficult philosopher and nonlinear science is to emphasize that both have replaced a transcendental essentiality with dynamic processes that are immanent to energy and matter. As Deleuze, like Kant, does not believe in essences, but unlike Kant is a realist, a large portion of DeLanda's book comes to deal with morphogenesis as a mode of ontological determination, answering how a thing can be said to be if there is neither an ideal essence behind the apparent contingency of its form nor an absolute phenomenal connection between perceiving subject and perceived object.
Deleuze often assumed that his readers were familiar with the mathematical disciplines of dynamic processes such as differential geometry and group theory. As Bent SÖrensen has pointed out, one of the great achievements of DeLanda's book is that it explains the mathematical consistency of Deleuzean concepts such as`multiplicity', symmetry-breaking transitions',`singularities', and`concrete universals' (SÖrensen, 2003) . But apart from this survey of mathematical terms for morphogenetical processes, DeLanda spends the main sections of the book following a Kantian thread and discourses specifically about actualizations of virtual space and virtual time.
In regard to time, DeLanda presents two remarkable propositions. In the first he argues that time is not in itself extensive, as has been held conscientiously throughout the Western history of time, including the dominant branches of physics: classical mechanics, modern thermodynamics, and relativity theory. Instead, the first proposition says that time is intensive, which means that time is not measurable according to a divisible, metric scale but rather that it is a quality intrinsic to things, like temperature or pressure, which may change their modality of being if reduced or increased. According to DeLanda, this intensive temporal structure encompasses, or envelops, the traditionally extensive formation of time. (10) The second proposition concerns therefore the question of morphogenesis in a nonessentialist`space-time' continuum. Morphogenesis comes about by a transition from a virtual to an actual state of being. Like Mackenzie, DeLanda argues that there are two realms of reality that intensive sciences must deal with: the virtual and the actual. It is crucial to recognize that the division between these two does not correspond to classical divisions in philosophy such as the ideal and the phenomenal, the essence and the appearance. The difference is different, because the virtual is not more ideal, or more pure than the actual. They are both equally real, immanent to each other, but the virtual does not have form.
Deleuzean time according to DeLandà`I ntensive time'', says DeLanda, is a``nonmetric time, a temporal continuum which through a symmetry-breaking process yields the familiar, divisible and measurable time of everyday experience' ' (2002, page 84) . In fact, both virtual time and actual time are intensive, but only actual time is formal and thus measurable in sequences of cycles. Actual time is not metric, but may become metric during a process that reduces its symmetry and privileges one rhythm over the other cycles: this interval then appears as linear and extensive. Following this definition,``the term`extensive' may be applied to a flow of time already divided into instants of a given extension or duration'' (page 84, emphasis in original)öfor example, the mechanical measurement of seconds in clocks. Now, unlike for Mackenzie, it is not clocktime that forms the virtual event of time for DeLanda. In a fascinating maneuver, DeLanda shows how nonmetric time, as it has been appropriated by nonlinear science, corresponds to what Deleuze terms actual time, or Chronos. Actual time is the coexisting plurality of time-formations, which Mackenzie also dealt with. But the conditions of existence for these plural time-formations differ radically between Mackenzie's and DeLanda's accounts.
When we say``I'll meet you at five'' and when five o'clock comes we actually meet, or when we say``we left home two hours ago'' and it explains why nobody answered the telephone, or when Catherine Ndereba set a new world record for the marathon with two hours, twenty-three minutes, and fifty-five seconds, we intend a time based upon a specific mode of experience. In this mode of experience, things take place in a flow of time that can be divided into regular segments. The time of this experience is called metric time. It was shown in a previous quotation that Freud believed that perception-consciousness produced metric time to protect the unconscious. DeLanda also believes that metric time is produced, but not by a psychological mechanismö rather, he refers to Iberall's homeokinetic theory of physics, which suggests that nonmetric time may spontaneously produce a metric shape under certain conditions.
In itself, actual time is a nested set of cycles of different temporal scales. An organism, for example, has several different cycles such as digestive cycles, respiration cycles, menstruation cycles, sleeping cycles, etc. These temporal scales form a set of polyrhythmic periodizations or oscillations within a certain limited system. But what determines the temporal limit of such a system? In the case of an organism, the complex multitude of time scales involved can be seen as embedded in one predominant scaleöfor instance, in that of the individuation cycle (the duration necessary for (10) DeLanda's argument refers to Arthur Iberall (1972) .
replacing all, or most, cells of an individual without affecting the organism's identity). This cycle has been identified by a symmetry-breaking transition. It determines the organism's intrinsic time, the time that this system has. This time can then be divided according to its pulsation, which becomes the metric time of the organism.
The question is how the singularization of such a predominant time scale comes about. In quite technical terms, DeLanda argues that a spontaneous organization of a temporal border around a nested set can be brought about if a`steady state attractor' is converted into a periodic one. This can take place under a so-called Hopf bifurcation that breaks the symmetry of the nested cycles. During a bifurcation the virtual attractors of a given system are exposed to a shock, which, if it is powerful enough, reorganizes them and thereby reduces the degree of symmetry of the system. Metrization begins when a bifurcation`syncopates' the vector field that determines the phase structure of nonmetric cycles. In the case of singling out an individuation cycle, such a bifurcation reduces the symmetry until only one nonlinear oscillation remains, which displays a characteristic period and amplitude for that system. This nonlinear oscillation forms a time scale intrinsic to the individual.
The Iberall theory of nonlinear oscillations corresponds to a Deleuzean notion of the`living present'öan actual time that monadically contracts the near future and the past into itself as a relatively extended present. This time is in Deleuzean terms referred to as Chronos, the description of which DeLanda quotes from The Logic of Sense:``In accordance to Chronos, only the present exists in time. Past, present and future are not three dimensions of time; only the present fills time, whereas past and future are two dimensions relative to the present in time'' (2002, page 88, quoted from Deleuze, 1990, page 162) . Present moments do not amount to an instant; there are no instants cut off from the past and future, only cycles of different size and duration that overlap other cycles. Ranging in size from subatomic vibrations to the pulsation of stars and galaxies, there is no other external point from which to determine the size of a present cycle than another cycle. Each cycle is a present, including the interval between the Big Bang and the Big Crunchöif there is such a thing.
Virtual time is that which determines the form and the possible entrainments of these nonmetric cycles. In order to explain this intensive time, DeLanda moves to a discussion of biologist Arthur Winfree's work in the field of behavioural cycles. Two aspects of Winfree's experiments are of importance: first, his experimental proof that temporal cycles can be both annihilated by an external shock as well as produced by an external stimulus; and, second, that nonlinear oscillations in a group of individuals tend to synchronize spontaneously. An intrinsic nonmetric time scale is thus to be understood not as`internal', but as one that is reaching out toward the externality of the system. For instance:``the capacity of nonlinear oscillators to entrain one another's temporal behaviour is a particularly striking example of this other aspect of the intensive, allowing biological oscillators, for instance, to synchronize their sleep-awake cycles with cycles outside themselves such as the day-night cycle of the planet'' (2002, page 93, emphasis in original). Given the quotation from Deleuze above, what is the status of this outside if a present can last the lifetime of the universe?
Virtual time is not a time outside, but rather is the time`between' cycles entraining other cycles, a potential, formless time in which new cycles may be produced, annihilated, opened, or closed for entraining other presents. Changes in virtual time produces changes in the modality of actual time (a change of its potentiality), not changes in its duration. Virtual time has no form in itself but gives form to temporal cycles; it is a time Deleuze calls Aeon, which, contrary to Chronos, does not have a present but only a simultaneous future and past. In A Thousand Plateaus, one may read: ``Aeon: the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, a something that is both going to happen and has just happened. Chronos: the time of measure that situates things and persons, develops a form, and determines a subject'' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, page 262) . The passage where this quotation appears is where Deleuze and Guattari describe the morphogenetic processes that decide the individuation of a system. A fundamental concept here is haecceity. Derived from Duns Scotus's concept haec, meaning`this thing', and also from the misconception of the term`ecceity' from ecce, meaning`here is', haecceity is a concept reserved for the particular mode of individuation that defines Deleuze and Guattari's Spinozean understanding of a body. The individuality of a body comes neither from its form nor from its substance, it has nothing to do with the subject or the organs it is made up of: in terms of haecceity, a body is determined by its longitude and latitude, what Deleuze and Guattari describe as``the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude)'' (page 261). In different words, the haecceities of a body consist of`r elations of movement and rest between molecules and particles, capacities to affect and be affected'' (page 261). A body is determined not by what it is, but by what it can do.
What I have previously referred to as`variables' are in this sense haecceities that may assemble a concrete individual: a degree of heat, pressure, a certain speed or increased density, a tone of color may all determine the shape of a given body. A body thus individuated from the fluctuations of haecceities has an intrinsic time cycle. The virtual time, Aeon, in which this intrinsic time cycle is set, is not itself cyclical; Aeon is the time of abstract machines, or assemblages, which emit haecceities and produce various forms. A single haecceity can be as simple as the poisonous red of a bug. Red is in this case not a signal or a sign from bug to bird saying``do not eat me'': there is no subject that sends`red' as a message and there is no one that can code or decode it, hence there is no message; red constitutes merely a tendency, a single trajectory formed by an abstract singularity or haecceity that composes the body of the bug as its longitude and latitude on a plane of life. The thereby extended life cycle of the bug is entrained with other external cycles (for example, with the spectral frequencies of red and with the disturbances of the metabolic cycles in the predator's body); these and other cycles allow the bug to form further, more complex bodily functions. All these concrete cycles must have their differences repeated in order for the haecceity to`link' them into an intrinsic one that individuates the body. The cycles do not belong to the bug; to the contrary, the cycles produce it. Deleuze and Guattari argue,``Individuation of a life is not the same as the individuation of the subject that leads it or serves as its support. It is not the same Plane: in the first case, it is the plane of consistency or of composition of haecceities, which knows only speeds and affects; and in the second case, it is the altogether different plane of forms, substances and subjects '' (1988, pages 261^262) .
The virtual bodies, or assemblages of haecceities, whose production of individuation is described in this section of A Thousand Plateaus are the BwOs. As I declared in the introduction, it is my intention to produce a BwO to keep that diagrams from being stratified, or`reified' into historical objects. It should be noticed that I consider the very production of a BwO a process that in itself achieves the desired destratification of diagrams. The strategy has to do with inventing a new passage between the virtual and the actual planes. In order to keep abstract diagrams from sclerosis or mineralization, Deleuze and Guattari argue that one``must avoid an oversimplified conciliation'' of the two planes, yet simultaneously``one continually passes from one to the other'' because onè`r econstitutes one plane on top of another, or extricates one from the other'' (page 269).'' This is how I will make a BwO: through experimentation (see pages 149^166). But, first, a moment of reflection: the means by which I have so far tried to prepare for a creative folding of the lines of haecceities has been what I called a pseudo-dialectical history of time, history, technology, and visuality. As a history, it was not a history proper: it did not provide an exhaustive rendering of the`most important' developments, innovations, and events in their respective field. Rather, it was a cut, a sample of some historical formations that have individuated themselves as shocks to history. Most importantly, I tried to locate a shift in the intrinsic rhythm of this sample as a whole. That shift, which I located around the 1920söwith Atget's photography, Einstein's relativity theory, Musil's literature, Benjamin's criticism, and Freud's later work on war neurosesöwould from a DeLandean perspective point towards a bifurcation of the hypercomplex vector field that determined the historical form of this sample of Western modernity. Now, as an interesting historical correspondence, this suggests that another bifurcation of history took place after the Second World War, this time strong enough to begin to produce discursive and nondiscursive formations on an immanent actual^virtual field, thereby giving rise to the dramatically increased number of nonlinear sciences, digital technologies, and immanent philosophies that, for example, characterize DeLanda's index lists. In this sense, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (1997) is already itself a history doubled with a becoming, but a becoming what? Its deterritorialized history does not propose any other elements to determine the abstract machines than the differentiations and integrations that a new historical knowledge assumes as its power, its right. Unless this limitation is challenged, we risk heading towards a repetitive crystalization of leftist Marxism a© la Henri Lefebvre, Oskar Negt, Maurizio Lazzarato, or Antonio Negri. That in itself provokes a desire to think through the possibility of a less necessary and more creative political body, with the capacity to resist certain haecceities or entire diagrams.
But before looking closer at this possibility a quick repetition on how to create a body may be useful: DeLanda's reference to Winfree's research on behavioral cycles suggests that attractors may change, appear, or vanish as a result of an external shock, effectuating a bifurcation. A bifurcation causes a phase transition among a set of nested cycles, meaning that cycles alter their intrinsic rhythm in relation to each other. Alterations in one system may produce a bifurcation in a different system as the intrinsic time of a system always relates outwards. During a bifurcation, it is not only a formation of an intrinsic time that may come about, but also a completely new system with its own nesting of cycles. As DeLanda puts it,``Brand new designs may come about through relative accelerations in these parallel processes '' (2002, page 95, emphasis in original) . These new designs have their own pseudo-autonomous intrinsic time-formations, and they, in turn, are creative and form new processes:`I f embryonic development occurs in parallel, if bundles of relatively independent processes occur simultaneously, then new designs may arise from disengaging bundles, or more precisely from altering the duration of one process relative to another, or the relative timing of the start or end of a process. This evolutionary design strategy is known as heterochrony, of which the most extensively studied case is the process called`neoteny' '' (page 97).
The BwO of heterochrony: screen and image
The BwO is the heterochronous symbiosis between perception and screen. On the one hand, heterochrony in this symbiotic sense is a process that makes new modes of visual representation possible. On the other hand, the potential for an evolution of heterochronous (1997, page 139) : an abstract machine that searches among neighboring systems for relations of loose singularities or``singularities of resistance, ready to modify these relations, overthrow them and change the unstable diagrams'' (Deleuze, 1986, page 130) . The capacity of human perception varies from individual to individual regarding what upper and lower limits of cyclic speeds and frequencies one is able to engage with. But although there are variations that depend on age, cultural belonging, genetical disposition, training, etc there are spectra beyond the range of which human senses cannot respond. These limits are not, however, historically or socially fixed. The historical development of visual perceptibility is neither natural nor slow: the fewest of us would, like General Stumm, feel the risk of mental collapse today in a city like Vienna, even if some may feel a similar sensation on their first visit to Las Vegas. (11) Following Bergson, one could suggest that cycles that are perceptible are so because they nest with cycles and vibrations of the human sensuousness itself; but this nesting is not a question of a correspondence, or a linkage between autonomous parts. As Bergson once put it:``The truth is that the point P, and the rays which it emits, the retina and the nervous elements affected, form a single whole; that the luminous point P is a part of this whole; and that it is really in P, and not elsewhere, that the image of P is formed and perceived' ' (1991, page 43) . Further, if it is true that the mode of perception alters with technical developments of new media, we can include media in Bergson's concept of the`image' and differentiate its symmetry according to its capacity to enable new visual forms. This capacity can be measured by its virtual technicityöthat is, the activities of the probe head and the relative instability of the diagram: how susceptible is it to be affected, how much does it affect other diagrams? On a concrete level we can say that with the development of visual media the image extends its range of affection.
If images are perceptions that originate neither within the subject (they are not phenomena) nor among the things in the world outside the subject (they are not objects), but are produced in the interactions, or affectations between themöwithin a humanworld-media wholeöthen the human capacity for sensuousness is merely one set of variables or haecceities that condition the formation of an image. Other variables on equal footing with human sensuousness are, for instance, frequencies and intensities, relative deceleration or acceleration, size, weight, or growth. Human engagement is not even necessary: images also occur in affectations between nonhuman bodies. The complexity of bodies affecting each other can reach extreme heights, but can also be very simple.
An image may also be called a block of affect. It is always produced under the relative becoming of bodies, under the process of their mutual affections. As Deleuze and Guattari wrote:``Becoming is always double, that which one becomes becomes no less than the one that becomesöblock is formed, essentially mobile, never in equilibrium. Mondrian's is the perfect square '' (1988, page 305 ). If we now call technicity the virtual measure of possible production of images, it is always with regard to the actual heterochrony of becoming. So how does the screen fit into this? There is a clue in the phrase``Mondrian's is the perfect square'', which continues:``It balances on one corner and produces a diagonal that half-opens its closure, carrying away both sides.'' (11) La Vegas is a wonderful example of an urban probe head that found and integrated loose singularities into a new abstract machine; the potentiality of this new machine included a very particular symmetry-breaking transition, which in turn could actualize itself only as a result of various trajectories that existed in the neighborhood: the legal differences between California and Nevada, the Hoover Dam, the growing population of Los Angeles, a booming economic consumer culture, US postwar identity, etc. For an analysis of the history of the area see Michael Dear (2000).
The diagonal that Mondrian produced is of a very specific kind; it does not imitate or represent any`real' diagonal, but is itself any possible diagonal, just like the colors, red, blue, and yellow may blend into all possible colors and black and white may become all tones of grey. A Mondrian painting may potentially host all other paintings, or in other words: it is painting at its highest degree of symmetry. Therefore, it is perfect in the sense Baruch Spinoza would have used the term: it has the highest degree of reality. The screen is like a Mondrian painting in the sense of a deterritorialized landscape with a high degree of symmetry, capable of hosting an infinite amount of different representations. More importantly, however, the screen is a body whose haecceities were emitted by an abstract machine with an enormous potential to find undifferentiated singularities and thus to produce new BwOs.
The screens that produced images prior to the 19th centuryöfor example, the shadow-puppet theatre, the camera obscura, and the frames used for perspective drawingsöwere rivaled by very different types of screens by the turn of the century: the diorama, the phantasmagoria, and rotating image devices like the zoetrope, the phenakistoscope, or the ludoscope. The novelty of these screens was their heterochronous capacity to render movement`plastic', understood in the art-historical sense. In the diorama a show was displayed on a translucent, painted screenöoften a cityscapeö onto and through which colored lights produced the impression of a shift from daylight to night and back to morning light in no more than a few minutes. In the very different type of screen produced by the revolving image toys a moving image repeated itself with variable speed at an interval of merely a few seconds. In another famous example, the horror spectacle of Etienne Gaspard Robert's (Robertson) phantasmagoria, which became immensely popular among the early-19th-century bourgeoisie in both Europe and the United States, a large center-stage screen was lit from behind by several magic lanterns operated by a number of assistants, and were sometimes even mounted on wheels to increase or reduce the size of the projected image. A show could be meticulously composed with sound effects and a number of various image projections around the room: it was reported that Robertson projected a decapitated head onto smoke to create a ghastly effect, that bats crawled in the corners and flew under the ceiling, and that Death himself came out of the center screen (Borton, 2000) .
The horrors produced inside the phantasmagoria were real, not because the pictures projected were very frightening in themselves, but because the violent affect blocks created by the technicity as a whole were real. The phantasmagoria was a site where new images were produced and where different affectations were cultivated. Three years before writing Through the Looking Glass, in 1869, Lewis Carroll composed a long poem called Phantasmagoria, which begins with an unexpected encounter with a ghost.
There was a strangeness in the room And Something white and wavy Was standing near me in the gloomö I took it for the carpet-broom Left by that careless slavey. But presently the Thing began To shiver and to sneeze: On which I said``Come, come, my man! That's a most inconsiderate plan. Less noise there, if you please!''`I 've caught a cold'', the Thing replies,`O ut there upon the landing.'' I turned to look in some surprise, And there, before my very eyes, A little Ghost was standing!'' (Carroll, 1911 ).
Carroll, one might recall, was introduced by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense as the modern logician of simulacra who realized that``two paradoxes form an alternative' ' (1990, page 32) . In the quotation above, Carroll literally performs the movement through the looking glass, from a logic of representation to the logic of sense: evoking, in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, the``nonhuman becomings of man'' (1994, page 169, original emphasis), first by sensing`a strangeness in the room' and second by conversing with a snivelling ghost, mistaken for a carpet broom, and for a man. The passage describes how blocks of affect were created in the phantasmagoria. Shocking and paradoxical sensations of sound and visual appearances did not exclude each other into a forgetful Nachtra« glichkeit during the frightening experience: instead they produced alternative objectsöemotions, brooms, devils, and spectresöall of them images with a different measure of virtual technicity. Quite different blocks of affect were created while peeking into image drums or upon visiting the more sober diorama performances.
With these entertaining screens were composed new images, or affect blocksönot because the mechanics managed to imitate natural human perception, but because the diorama, the phantasmagoria, and the image drums introduced an increased ratio of heterochrony in the relation between screen-image cycles and the cycles of everyday perception images. As a result, the new images were able to entrain other cycles than before (violent occult appearances, machinic rhythms and dances, repetitious comedy, pornographic movements). Therefore, the screen images were not inherently fragmented: instead, they created a new whole with its own particular intrinsic time-scale nesting with the cycles of everyday experience.
As a result, partially of this process, the logic of representation increasingly weakened in the face of the logic of simulacra and sensation. For example, a journalist from the Mechanic's Magazine reported the following on 31 January 1824 after a visit to a diorama show:`T he representation of a stream of water flowing down a small and slight declivity is so perfectly natural as to impress every observer with the conviction that the artist has contrived, by some ingenious mechanism, to let real water issue from an aperture made in that part of the canvas'' (quoted in Gernsheim and Gernsheim, 1956, page 17) . Unlike the popular art-historical fable about the competition of representation between Zeuxis and Parrhasius, (12) this quotation does not describe a representation indistinguishable from the real thing; instead it describes a mode of representation which, being perfectly natural', refers to some imaginary though ingenious mechanism that sprouts water from the canvas. Is that not the same thing? Not at all: the primary achievement in the diorama was not concerned with the representational proximity between a picture and the real thing. Instead of measuring success from the truthfulness of its representation, it was the technical capacity for producing new and astonishing pictures that was celebrated. It is the image of an`ingenious mechanism' for representation that stunned the reporteröbut in the particular sense, I think, that, had such a machine indeed been installed, the admiration would have been less immediate. Paradoxically, yet productively, the natural representation refers to an image of a machine, but a machine that can be brought to existence only by a representation produced by other means.
These new images belong to those identified as movement-images in Deleuze's first book on cinema (1997). However, whereas for Deleuze cinema is a specific medium for (12) According to a frequently reiterated myth, Zeuxis painted grapes that fooled the birds to peck on the canvas; Parrhasius proved himself superior with an image veiled by a painted curtain which Zeuxis tried to remove so as to better see the painting. movement-images (he is somewhat unclear regarding cartoons), I will dare a broader definition. It is perhaps not cinema itself, but rather the technicity of the screen that gives an autonomous body to movement as image. For instance, already the image drum produced something other than an image of a horse: it produced an image of galloping: not a representation of a horse galloping, but a galloping image. Such a movement-image determined itself by the number of pictures and by the speed of the rotating drum, by the hand cranking it, the eye peeking through the slits, and by their distance; if the image gallops, it extends to the viewer. The legs that gallop are of the same body as the hand cranking the drum. The body producing a movement-image forms a whole, but a whole that is``neither given nor giveable '', but open (1997, page 9) . It means that one can add and subtract parts of the body without that necessitating a change of its identity. The body is determined by what it can do, and formed by the haecceities that sets its limits. The movement-images of the diorama, the image drums, and the phantasmagoria were as much movement-images as those of the cinema, and no less than those that came much later, with television and all the various computer screens, displays, and monitors that surround us today.
Conclusion
Can these movement-images, which exist on any screen whose technicity has the capacity of forming them, have the power to protect DeLanda's diagrams from historical coagulation? Perhaps not by themselves, like some shield of armor, but they may play a fundamental role in a strategy against the temptation to historicize diagrams.
The technicity of movement-images is irreducible to any historization of abstract diagrams because what a history first of all would have to subtract in order to organize or structure the diagrams is any ambiguity between the writer and the object of history. By rendering technicity as the measure of affect blocks, it is clear that the historical scholar is an image as well. Furthermore, he, she, or it (the killer-robot historian) is an image emphatically affected by its objects, which are images in their own right, and thus both, as one whole, are always becoming different, producing new blocks of affect. In technical terms: on the virtual plane, it is their higher symmetry that makes diagrams both able to immanently cause the production of images and at the same time unable to register and preserve their difference even though the diagrams are what preserve the very potentiality for difference. The consequence is that the historical requirement of a clear distinction between agent and object simply dissolves on the plane of diagrams. Therefore, a proper history of diagrams is impossible. A history of movement-images would take the form of a complex symbiotic evolution rather than of a chronicle over humankind's relationship to visual technology.
Abstract diagrams are then certainly dislocated from the site where the most rigid histories prefer them to be: in the heads of brilliant and ambitious men and women. However, merely dissociating abstract diagrams from the lone genius is not enough. It must also be dissociated from the manifestation of the historical event itself, without becoming a transcendental instance. This is why the movement-images of visual machines are particularly suitable: because they do not follow the questionable strategy of privileging an alternative sense over vision in the attempt to dismantle the ocularcentric essentialism of Western thought. Instead, they celebrate the forces of vision and visuality (and visionaries and theorists and other illuminati) by affirming a nondialectical, indeed nonphenomenal notion of image. A historical event must last and be visible to as many people as possible. The screen, on the other hand, is hardly ever seen: unless it does something it is not seen at all. The images it carries (not the pictures) are measured by what they can do: what affect blocks they can produce, annihilate, and entrainönot by how long they last. Pictures can certainly be manifestations of historical events, for they result from a symmetry-breaking process that makes them present in metric time and space. Several images can be involved in the crystalization of one picture, and millions of pictures may be the effect of one image. Hence, the dissociation between diagrams and manifestations of historical events is thus a matter of longitude and latitude: diagrams have a higher symmetry than both images and pictures and are affected only by other diagrams.
A last, daring suggestion: it may be that the particular movement-images are actualizations of the element called a`probe head', which is the abstract machine that searches``a space of possible forms'' and which, in DeLanda's words,``is, of course, blind (or more exactly, shortsighted), following the key principle of neo-Darwinsim: evolution has no foresight' ' (1997, page 139, emphasis in original) . If this is true, if movement-images are immanently caused by a probe head, then a real history corresponding to the evolution of screen images should pay more attention to the lead staked out by shortsighted affect blocks than to false abstract diagrams that promise to reveal themselves.
